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EXPONENTIALLY FAST CONVERGENCE TO
(STRICT) EQUILIBRIUM VIA HEDGING
JOHANNE COHEN∗, AMÉLIE HÉLIOU‡, AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS§
Abstract. Motivated by applications to data networks where fast conver-
gence is essential, we analyze the problem of learning in generic N-person
games that admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Specifically, we con-
sider a scenario where players interact repeatedly and try to learn from past
experience by small adjustments based on local – and possibly imperfect –
payoff information. For concreteness, we focus on the so-called “hedge” vari-
ant of the exponential weights (EW) algorithm where players select an action
with probability proportional to the exponential of the action’s cumulative
payoff over time. When the players have perfect information on their mixed
payoffs, the algorithm converges locally to a strict equilibrium and the rate of
convergence is exponentially fast – of the order of O(exp(−a
∑t
j=1 γj)) where
a > 0 is a constant and γj is the algorithm’s step-size. In the presence of un-
certainty, convergence requires a more conservative step-size policy, but with
high probability, the algorithm still achieves an exponential convergence rate.
1. Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the following questions: if the players of a re-
peated game update their strategies in an individually rational way (for instance,
following an algorithm that leads to no regret), do the players’ mixed strategies
themselves converge to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game? If so, what is
the resulting rate of convergence and how is it affected by imperfections in the
information available to the players?
These questions are largely motivated by the extremely successful applications
of game theory to data networks [15] and wireless communications [12] where fast
convergence to a stable state is essential. In this broad context, players naturally
have a very localized view of their environment, typically limited to an estimate
of the payoff of their strategies that is often subject to random – and possibly
unbounded – errors and noise. Thus, to improve their individual payoffs as the
game is repeated, we assume that players try to learn from past experiences by
employing a suitable learning algorithm that induces small adjustments at each
stage.
One of the most widely used learning algorithms of this kind is the so-called
exponential weights (EW) algorithm which is known to lead to “no regret” – i.e.
the players’ average payoff under EW is asymptotically the same as that of the
best fixed strategy in hindsight [13, 22]. More precisely, we focus on the “hedge”
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variant of EW [5] where the probability of choosing an action is proportional to
the exponential of its cumulative payoff – hence, better-performing actions are
employed exponentially more often. However, to account for the fact that players
may not have access to perfect payoff observations, we introduce a variable step-size
parameter which can be used to control the weight with which new observations
enter the algorithm, thus reducing the adverse effects of uncertainty.
Instead of restricting our attention to a specific class of games (such as zero-sum
or potential ones), we focus throughout on generic N -player games that admit a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Our first result is that, if players have perfect
mixed payoff observations, hedging with a variable step-size γt > 0 converges locally
to a strict Nash equilibrium at a rate of O(e−a
∑t
j=1 γj ), i.e. exponentially fast if
γt = Ω(1/t
β) for some β < 1. Otherwise, if players only have access to pure
payoff observations that are subject to estimation errors, the same convergence
rate holds with high probability, but the algorithm’s step-size must satisfy the
summability requirement
∑∞
t=1 γ
2
t <
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞. This restriction is needed in
order to control the aggregate variance of the noise so, unsurprisingly, it limits the
achievable convergence rates. Nevertheless, with high probability, the algorithm
still achieves an O(e−at1−β ) exponential rate for step-size sequences of the form
γt ∼ 1/tβ, β ∈ (1/2, 1), despite the noise. Finally, we show that the above results
hold globally if the game admits a unique, globally strict equilibrium.
Related Work. Algorithms and dynamics for learning in games have received con-
siderable attention over the last few decades. Such procedures can be divided into
two broad categories, depending on whether they evolve in continuous or discrete
time: the former includes the numerous dynamics for learning and evolution (see
[18] for a survey), whereas the latter focuses on learning algorithms for infinitely
iterated games (such as fictitious play and its variants). In this paper, we focus
exclusively on discrete-time algorithms.
In this framework, it is natural to consider agents who learn from their experi-
ence by small adjustments in their behavior based on local – and possibly imperfect
– information. Several such approaches in the literature can be viewed as decen-
tralized no-regret dynamics – for example the multiplicative/exponential weights
algorithm and its variants [5, 13, 22], Follow the Regularized/Perturbed Leader
[7], etc. Indeed, regret bounds can be used to guarantee that each player’s utility
approaches long-term optimality in adversarial environments, a natural first step
towards long-term rational behavior. For example, it has been shown in [1, 17] that
the sum of utilities approaches an approximate optimum, and there is convergence
of time averages towards an equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games [2, 4, 5]. In
all these examples, the players’ average regret vanishes at the worst-case rate of
O(1/√T ) where T denotes the play horizon. This convergence rate was recently
improved by Syrgkanis et al. [20] for a wide class of N -player normal form games
using a natural class of regularized learning algorithms. However, the convergence
results established in [20] concerned the set of coarse correlated equilibria which
may contain highly non-rationalizable (correlated) strategies that assign positive
weight only on strictly dominated strategies [21].
In this paper, we aim to provide a more refined analysis for generic N -player
games that admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In particular, we do not
derive convergence bounds for unilateral worst-case rationality criteria (such as
the minimization of the players’ external regret), but we focus squarely on the
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convergence of the players’ mixed strategies under hedging. To that end, we show
that HEDGE converges locally to strict equilibria and the rate of said convergence
is exponentially fast – even in the presence of feedback imperfections of arbitrary
magnitude.
The HEDGE algorithm was recently studied by Kleinberg et al. [8] who proved
that, in a specific class of load balancing games, the dynamics’ long-term limit
is exponentially better than the worst correlated equilibrium and almost as good
as that of the worst Nash. Krichene et al. [9] extended this result to congestion
games, and proved that a discounted variant of the HEDGE algorithm converges
to the set of Nash equilibria in the sense of Cesàaro means (time averages), while
strong convergence can be guaranteed with some additional conditions. Coucheney
et al. [3] also showed that a “penalty-regulated” variant of the HEDGE algorithm
with bandit feedback converges to ε-equilibrium in congestion games, but their
techniques do not extend to actual Nash equilibria.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 provides some definitions and preliminaries
used in the rest of the paper. In Section 3, we describe the HEDGE algorithm and
the players’ feedback and information models. Section 4 is split into two parts:
The first has the statement of our results (convergence and rate of convergence),
while the second one contains the mathematical apparaturs required to prove these
results. Section 5 concludes while some technical details have been relegated to
Appendix A.
2. Preliminaries
We begin with some basic definitions from game theory. Throughout the paper,
we focus on games that are played by a (finite) set N = {1, . . . , N} of N players
(or agents). Each player i ∈ N is assumed to have a finite set of actions (or pure
strategies) Si, and the players’ preferences for one action over another are repre-
sented by each action’s utility (or payoff ). Specifically, as players interact with each
other, the individual payoff of each player is given by a function ui : S ≡
∏
i Si → R
of all players’ actions, and each agent seeks to maximize the utility ui(si; s−i) of
his chosen action si ∈ Si against the action profile s−i of his opponents.1
A player can also use a mixed strategy by playing a probability distribution
xi = (xisi )si∈Si ∈ ∆(Si) over their action set Si. The resulting probability vector
xi is called the mixed strategy of the i-th player and the set Xi = ∆(Si) is the
corresponding mixed strategy space of player i. Based on this, we write X =∏i Xi
for the game’s strategy space, i.e. the space of all mixed strategy profiles x =
(xi)i∈N .
In this context (and in a slight abuse of notation), the expected payoff of the
i-th player in the mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) is
ui(x) =
∑
s1∈S1
· · ·
∑
sN∈SN
ui(s1, . . . , sN)x1s1 · · ·xNsN , (1)
Accordingly, if player i plays the pure strategy si in Si, we will write
visi (x) = ui(si;x−i) = ui(x1, . . . , si, . . . , xN ) (2)
1In the above (si; s−i) is shorthand for (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sN ), used here to highlight the action
of player i against that of all other players.
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for the payoff corresponding to the pure strategy si ∈ Si and vi(x) = (visi(x))si∈Si
for the payoff vector of player i. A player’s expected payoff can thus be written as
ui(x) =
∑
si∈Si
xisivisi (x) = 〈vi(x)|xi〉, (3)
where 〈vi|xi〉 denotes the canonical bilinear pairing between vi and xi.
The most widely used solution concept in game theory is that of a Nash equilib-
rium (NE), i.e. a state x∗ ∈ X that is unilaterally stable in the sense that
ui(x
∗
i ;x
∗
−i) ≥ ui(xi;x∗−i) for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ N , (NE)
or, equivalently, writing supp(x) for the support of x:
visi (x
∗) ≥ vis′i(x∗) for all si ∈ supp(x∗i ) and all s′i ∈ Si, i ∈ N . (4)
If x∗ is pure (i.e. supp(x∗i ) = {s∗i } for some s∗i ∈ Si and all i ∈ N ), then it is
called a pure equilibrium. In addition, x∗ is said to be strict if x∗ is pure and (4)
holds as a strict inequality for all s′i /∈ supp(x∗i ), i ∈ N . Equivalently, x∗ is a strict
equilibrium if every player has a unique best response to their opponents’ strategy
profile.
In generic games (i.e. games with no payoff ties), pure equilibria are also strict,
so our analysis will focus throughout on strict Nash equilibria. With this in mind,
we derive here a variational characterization of strict equilibria that plays a key
role in our analysis:
Proposition 1. The profile x∗ is a strict equilibrium if and only if
〈v(x)|x − x∗〉 ≤ − 12a‖x− x∗‖ for some a > 0 and for all x near x∗, (5)
where ‖x‖ =∑i∑s∈Si |xisi | denotes the L1-norm of x.
Motivated by this characterization of strict equilibria (which we prove in Appen-
dix A), we say that x∗ is a globally strict equilibrium if (5) holds for all x ∈ X – for
instance, as is easily seen to be the case in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Obviously, if
x∗ is globally strict, then it is the unique equilibrium of the game, similarly to the
notion of a globally evolutionarily stable state (GESS) in evolutionary game theory
[18].
3. Learning via hedging
The algorithm that we examine is the so-called “HEDGE” variant of the expo-
nential weights algorithm [5]. In a nutshell, the main idea of the algorithm is as
follows: At each stage t = 1, 2, . . . of the process, players maintain and update a
“performance score” for each of their actions (pure strategies) based on each action’s
cumulative payoff up to stage t. These scores are then converted to mixed strategies
by assigning exponentially higher probability to actions with higher scores; subse-
quently, a new action is drawn based on these mixed strategies, and the process
repeats. More precisely, we have the following iterative algorithm:
Algorithm 1 HEDGE with variable step-size γt
1 Each player i ∈ N has an initial score vector yi and plays with initial mixed strategy
xi = Λi(yi) where the logit map Λi is defined as
Λi(yi) =
1
∑
s∈Si
exp(yis)
(exp(yis))s∈Si . (6)
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2 for each round t
3 Each player i ∈ N draws a pure strategy si according to xi
4 Each player i observes their individual payoff vector vi(x)
5 Each player i updates their mixed strategy xi via the recursion
yi ← yi + γtvi(x),
xi ← Λi(yi)
(HEDGE)
end for
As stated above, (HEDGE) tacitly assumes that players have perfect knowledge
of their mixed payoff vectors vi(x(t)) at each iteration of the algorithm. However,
in practical applications of game theory – especially in large networks and telecom-
munication systems – this assumption is often too stringent. For this reason, much
of our analysis will concern the case where players only have access to a possibly
imperfect estimate vˆ(t) of their pure payoff vector vi(s(t)) ≡ (ui(s; s−i(t))s∈Si given
the pure strategy profile s(t) ∈ S drawn at stage t. In other words, we will be inter-
ested in the case where players can only estimate the payoff of their pure strategies
given the chosen actions of all other players.
Formally, this can be represented by the general feedback model
vˆi(t) = vi(s(t)) + ξi(t), (7)
where the error process ξ = (ξi)i∈N satisfies the statistical hypotheses
1. Zero-mean:
E[ξ(t) | Ft] = 0 for all t = 1, 2, . . . (a.s.). (H1)
2. Finite mean squared error: there exists some σ > 0 such that
E[‖ξ(t)‖2∞ | Ft] ≤ σ2 for all t = 1, 2, . . . (a.s.). (H2)
In the above, the expectation E[ · ] is taken with respect to the randomness induced
by the players’ mixed strategies and the error process ξ, while Ft denotes the history
of x(t) up to stage t.2 Put differently, Hypotheses (H1) and (H2) simply mean that
the players’ estimates vˆi are conditionally unbiased and bounded in mean square,
i.e.
E[vˆ(t) | Ft] = v(x(t)), (8a)
E[‖vˆ(t)‖2∞ | Ft] ≤ L2, (8b)
where L > 0 is a finite positive constant (in the noiseless case, L is simply the play-
ers’ maximum absolute payoff). Thus, Hypotheses (H1) and (H2) allow for a broad
range of noise distributions, including all compactly supported, (sub-)Gaussian,
(sub-)exponential and log-normal distributions.
4. Analysis and results
4.1. Statement of the results. In this section, we provide our main convergence
results for the algorithm (HEDGE). For simplicity, we start with the perfect infor-
mation case:
2Formally, Ft is defined as the natural filtration induced by x(t) [6].
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Theorem 2. Suppose that (HEDGE) is run with perfect mixed payoff observations
and is initialized not too far from x∗. Then, we have
‖x(t) − x∗‖ ≤ Ce−a
∑t
j=1 γj , (9)
where C > 0 is a constant that depends on the initialization of (HEDGE) and a > 0
is a constant that only depends on the game. In particular, if
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞, x(t)
converges to x∗.
Corollary 3. If the algorithm (HEDGE) is run with assumptions as above and a
constant step-size γ, we have
‖x(t)− x∗‖ = O(e−aγt). (10)
Remark 1. The locality of Theorem 2 has to do with the fact that a game may admit
several strict equilibria, so the algorithm’s end state depends on its initialization.
Instead, if x∗ is globally strict (meaning that the game admits a unique Nash
equilibrium), the above results hold globally and there is no dependence on the
algorithm’s initialization (for a precise statement, see Theorem 6 below).
Remark 2. We should also note here that the convergence rate (9) improves with
larger step-sizes γt. The reason for this (fairly surprising) behavior is that, when
there are no estimation errors, the algorithm consistently reinforces the players’
equilibrium strategies near a strict equilibrium. As a result, in the absence of
uncertainty, players can employ (HEDGE) in a very greedy fashion and achieve
arbitrarily fast convergence rates – in stark contrast to standard results in game-
theoretic learning and convex optimization which often require a small, decreasing
step-size. We show below that this property is inextricably tied to the absence
of uncertainty: if the players’ observations are affected by even a modicum of
randomness, it is necessary to use a more conservative step-size policy (cf. Theorem
4).
Remark 3. Regarding the game’s dimensionality (i.e. the number of players and
actions per player), it can be shown that C = O(∑i∈N |Si|) while a depends only
on the relative differences between the players’ payoffs – specifically, we can take
a = miniminsi 6=s∗i
[
ui(s
∗)− ui(si; s∗−i)
]
> 0. In other words, the algorithm’s half-
life is asymptotically independent of the size of the game.
The basic ingredient of the proof of Theorem 2 (presented at the end of this
section) is as follows. First, assuming the algorithm starts relatively close to a
given strict equilibrium, we show that the induced sequence of play always remains
nearby. Then, by studying the evolution of the players’ score variables y(t), we
show that the cumulative payoff difference between a player’s equilibrium strategy
and all other pure strategies grows asymptotically as O(∑tj=1 γj) for large t. The
derived exponential rate is then a consequence of the properties of the logit map Λ.
On the other hand, if the players’ payoff observations are subject to noise and
stochastic uncertainty, a single unlucky estimation could drive x(t) away from the
basin of a strict equilibrium, possibly never to return. As a result, any local con-
vergence result in the presence of noise must be probabilistic in nature. This is
emphasized in our next result which shows that convergence can be achieved with
probability arbitrarily close to 1:
Theorem 4. Fix a confidence level ε > 0 and suppose that the algorithm (HEDGE)
is run with a small enough step-size γt satisfying
∑∞
t=1 γ
2
t <
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞ and
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imperfect pure payoff information satisfying Hypotheses (H1) and (H2). If x∗ is a
strict equilibrium and (HEDGE) is initialized not too far from x∗, we have
P
(
‖x(t) − x∗‖ ≤ C′e−a
∑t
j=1 γj for all t
)
≥ 1− ε, (11)
where a > 0 is a constant that only depends on the game and C′ > 0 is a (random)
constant that depends on the initialization of (HEDGE). In particular, under the
stated assumptions, x(t)→ x∗ with probability at least 1− ε.
Corollary 5. With assumptions as above, if the algorithm (HEDGE) is run with a
step-size of the form γt = γ/t
β for some sufficiently small γ > 0 and β ∈ (1/2, 1),
we have
P
(
‖x(t)− x∗‖ = O
(
e−
aγ
1−β
t1−β
))
≥ 1− ε, (12)
Remark 4. In contrast to the full information case, the “ℓ2 − ℓ1” summability
requirement
∑∞
t=1 γ
2
t <
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞ constrains the admissible step-size policies
that lead to strict equilibrium (for instance, constant step-size policies are no longer
admissible). In particular, the most aggressive step-size that can be used in the
presence of noise is γt ∝ t−β for some β close (but not equal) to 1/2, leading to
a convergence rate of λt
1−β
for some λ < 1 (cf. Corollary 5). This bound on β is
due to the second moment control required by Doob’s maximal inequality; if there
is finer control on the moments of the noise process ξ (for instance, if the noise
is sub-exponential), the lower bound β > 1/2 can be pushed all the way down to
β > 0, implying a quasi-linear convergence rate.
As was hinted above, the main idea behind the proof of Theorem 4 is to use
Doob’s maximal inequality for martingales to show that the probablity of x(t)
escaping the basin of attraction of a strict equilibrium x∗ can be made arbitrarily
small if the algorithm’s step-size is chosen appropriately. Once this probabilistic
estimate is in place, convergence is obtained roughly as in the case of Theorem 2.
Building on this, if x∗ is globally strict, we have the stronger result:
Theorem 6. Suppose that the algorithm (HEDGE) is run with a step-size γt such
that
∑∞
t=1 γ
2
t <
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞ and imperfect pure payoff observations satisfying
Hypotheses (H1) and (H2). If x∗ is a globally strict equilibrium, then:
(1) x(t)→ x∗ (a.s.).
(2) There exists a (deterministic) constant c > 0 depending only on the game
such that
‖x(t)− x∗‖ = O(e−c
∑t
j=1 γj ). (13)
Corollary 7. With assumptions as above, if (HEDGE) is run with a step-size of
the form γt = γ/t
β some β ∈ (1/2, 1), we have
‖x(t)− x∗‖ = O(e− aγ1−β t1−β ). (14)
As opposed to Theorems 2 and 4, the proof of Theorem 6 relies heavily on the
so-called Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence [10], defined here as
DKL(x
∗, x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
si∈Si
x∗isi log
x∗isi
xisi
for all x ∈ X ◦. (15)
The KL divergence is a positive-definite, asymmetric distance measure that is par-
ticularly well-adapted to the analysis of the replicator dynamics [11, 18, 23]. By
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using this divergence as a discrete-time Lyapunov function, we show that x∗ is a
recurrent point of the process x(t), i.e. x(t) visits any neighborhood of x∗ infinitely
many times. We then use an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 4 to show
that the process actually converges to x∗ at an asymptotic rate of O(e−c
∑t
j=1 γj ).
The step-size assumption in the statement of Theorem 6 is key in achieving
this, but it is important to note it can be relaxed to the lighter requirement∑t
j=1 γ
2
j
/∑t
j=1 γt → 0 if the players’ feedback noise is bounded (for instance,
if players have access to their actual pure payoff information). When this is the
case, it is possible to achieve a convergence rate of the form O(e−ct1−β ) for any
β > 0 by using a step-size sequence of the form γt ∝ 1/tβ. Finally, we should also
note that the multiplicative constant in (13) is O(∑i∈N |Si|), i.e. it is linear in the
dimensionality of the game (just as in the case of Theorems 2 and 4). As for the
constant c > 0, (13) holds for all c < a (where a > 0 is the payoff-based conver-
gence rate established in Theorems 2 and 4), showing that Theorem 6 guarantees
essentially the same exponential convergence rate as Theorems 2 and 4.
4.2. Proofs. Below we provide the proofs of the above results, relegating some
technical details to Appendix A. For simplicity, we begin with the perfect infor-
mation case (Theorem 2); we then build on this analysis to prove our convergence
results in the presence of uncertainty (Theorems 4 and 6).
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that x∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
N ) is a strict equilibrium. Then,
by continuity, there exists some a > 0 and a neighborhood U of x∗ such that
vis∗
i
(x)− visi (x) ≥ a for all x ∈ U and all si ∈ Si \ {s∗i }, i ∈ N .
Now, introduce the auxiliary variables
zisi = yisi − yis∗i , (16)
where yisi represents the cumulative payoff score of strategy si ∈ Si (cf. the defi-
nition of (HEDGE) in the previous section). Then, for allM > 0, Proposition A.8 in
Appendix A shows that the set UM = {x = Λ(y) : zisi ≤ −M for all si ∈ Si, i ∈ N}
is a neighborhood of x∗ in X ◦ which is contained in U if M is chosen large enough.
Thus, if x(t) ∈ UM , we get:
zisi(t+ 1) = zisi(t) + γt
[
visi (x(t)) − vis∗i (x(t))
]
(17a)
≤ zisi(t)− aγt (17b)
≤ −M − aγt (17c)
implying in particular that x(t+ 1) ∈ UM as well. Thus, if (HEDGE) is initialized
in UM , we obtain by induction that x(t) ∈ UM ⊆ U for all t.
To proceed, given that x(t) ∈ UM for all t, telescoping (17b) yields
zisi(t+ 1) ≤ −M − a
t∑
j=1
γj . (18)
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Hence, from the definition of Λ (see (6)), we obtain:
xis∗
i
(t+ 1) =
1
1 +
∑
si 6=s∗i
exp(zisi(t+ 1))
≥ 1−
∑
si 6=s∗i
exp(zisi(t+ 1))
≥ 1−
∑
si 6=s∗i
e−Me−a
∑t
j=1 γj . (19)
Therefore, since ‖xi − x∗i ‖ = 1− xis∗i +
∑
si 6=s∗i
xisi = 2(1− xis∗i ), rearranging (19)
yields
‖x(t+ 1)− x∗‖ ≤ 2
∑
i∈N
∑
si 6=s∗i
e−Me−a
∑t
j=1 γj , (20)
and our assertion follows. 
We now turn to feedback imperfections, starting with Theorem 4:
Proof of Theorem 4. With notation as in the proof of Theorem 2, set zisi = yisi−yis∗i
and let M > 0 be such that uis∗i (x) − uisi(x) ≥ a for all si ∈ Si \ {s∗i }, i ∈ N ,
whenever x ∈ UM . Then, we have
zisi(t+ 1) = zisi(t) + γt
[
visi (x(t)) − vis∗i (x(t))
]
+ γtηisi (t), (21)
where ηisi(t) = vˆisi(t) − visi (x(t)) − (vˆis∗i (t) − vis∗i (x(t))). Thus, assuming that
(HEDGE) is initialized in U2M and telescoping, we get
zisi(t+ 1) ≤ −2M +
t∑
j=1
γj
[
visi(x(j)) − vis∗i (x(j))
]
+
t∑
j=1
γjηisi (j). (22)
We now claim that, if γt is chosen appropriately, we have
P
(
sup
t
∑t
j=1
γjηisi (j) ≤M
)
≥ 1− ε/(N(Si − 1)), (23)
where Si = |Si|. Indeed, let Xisi(t) =
∑t
j=1 γtηisi(t) and let Ei(t) denote the event
sup1≤j≤t|Xisi(j)| ≥ M . By Hypothesis (H1), Xisi(t) is a martingale so Doob’s
maximal inequality [6, Theorem 2.1] yields
P(Ei(t)) ≤ E[Xisi(t)
2]
M2
≤ 2σ
2
∑t
j=1 γ
2
j
M2
, (24)
where we used the noise variance estimate
E[η2isi (t)] = E[E[η
2
isi
(t) | Ft]] ≤ 2E[E[‖ξi(t)‖2∞ | Ft]] ≤ 2σ2, (25)
and the fact that E[ηisi (t)ηisi (t
′)] = 0 if t 6= t′. Since Ei(t + 1) ⊆ Ei(t) ⊆ . . . , it
follows that the event Ei =
⋂∞
t=1Ei(t) occurs with probability P(Ei) ≤ 2σ2Γ2/M2
where Γ2 =
∑∞
t=1 γ
2
t <∞. Thus, if γt is chosen so that Γ2 ≤ εM2/(2N(Si− 1)σ2),
we get P(Xisi(t) ≥M for all t) ≤ ε/(N(Si − 1)).
Assume therefore that Γ2 ≤ εM2/(2N(Si − 1)σ2). Then, we obtain
P(maxi∈i,si∈Si suptXisi(t) ≥M) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
si 6=s∗i
ε
N(Si − 1) ≤ ε. (26)
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Hence, going back to (22), a straightforward induction shows that x(t) ∈ UM for
all t with probability at least 1− ε. When this occurs, we also have
P(zisi(t+ 1) ≤ −M + a
t∑
j=1
γj for all n) ≤ 1− ε, (27)
and the bound (11) is obtained as in the proof of Theorem 4. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Since
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞, it clearly suffices to prove (13). Then,
given that x∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
N ) is pure, an easy calculation yields
DKL(x
∗, x) = −
∑
i∈N
log xis∗
i
= −
∑
i∈N
log(1− (1− xis∗
i
))
= −
∑
i∈N
log(1− ‖xi − x∗i ‖/2)
≥ 1
2
‖x− x∗‖, (28)
so it suffices to show that DKL(x
∗, x(t)) → 0. With this in mind, let Dt =
DKL(x
∗, x(t)). Then, Proposition A.8 in Appendix A yields
Dt+1 ≤ Dt + γt〈v(x(t))|x(t) − x∗〉+ γtψt + 1
2
γ2t ‖vˆ(t)‖2∞, (29)
where we have set ψt = 〈ξ(t)|x(t) − x∗〉. Using this bound, we will show that x(t)
visits any neighborhood U of x∗ infinitely many times.
Indeed, assume on the contrary that this is not so. Then, by Proposition 1, there
exists some δ > 0 such that 〈v(x(t))|x(t) − x∗〉 ≤ −αδ for all sufficiently large t.
Hence, telescoping (29) yields
Dt+1 ≤ D0 − aδ
t∑
j=1
γj +
t∑
j=1
γjψj +
1
2
t∑
j=1
γ2j ‖vˆ(j)‖2∞
≤ D0 − θt
[
aδ −
∑t
j=1 γjψj
θt
−
∑t
j=1 γ
2
j ‖vˆ(j)‖2∞
2θt
.
]
(30)
Since E[ψj | Fj ] = E[〈ξj |x(j)−x∗〉 | Fj ] = 〈E[ξj | Fj]|x(j)−x∗〉 = 0 and E[‖ψj‖2∞] ≤
4E[‖ξj‖2∞ | Fj] ≤ 4L2, it follows that the sum Rt =
∑t
j=1 γjψj is an L
2-bounded
martinagle [6].
Hence, by the law of large numbers for martingale differences [6, Theorem 2.18],
it follows that θ−1t
∑t
j=1 γjψj → 0 (a.s.). Likewise, if we let St =
∑t
j=1 γ
2
j ‖vˆ(j)‖2∞,
we readily get
E[St] = E[E[St] | Ft] ≤ L2
t∑
j=1
γ2j ≤ Γ2L2,
where Γ2 =
∑∞
j=1 γ
2
j . Hence, by Doob’s martingale convergence theorem [6, Theo-
rem 2.5], St converges to some (random) finite value (a.s.). Combining the above,
we conclude that the term in the brackets of (30) converges to aδ (a.s.). In turn,
this implies that Dt+1 → −∞, and this yields to a contradiction.
We have thus shown that x(t) visits infinitely many times every neighborhood
U of x∗ – and hence, in particular, the neighborhood U2M defined in the proof of
Theorem 4. Since x(t) remains in U2M with positive probability, it follows that
the probability that x(t) exits U2M infinitely many times is zero. We thus get
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x(t) ∈ U2M for all t greater than some random (but finite) t0; hence, telescoping
(21) starting at t0 yields
zisi(t+ 1) ≤ −2M − θt
[
a− θ−1t
∑t
j=t0
γjηisi(j)
]
. (31)
As above, the law of large numbers [6, Theorem 2.18] shows that the term in the
brackets of (31) converges to a. Hence, by (19), we finally obtain ‖x(t) − x∗‖ =
O(e−c
∑t
j=1 γj ) for all c ∈ (0, a), yielding our assertion. 
5. Conclusions
Our main goal in this paper was to analyse the convergence properties of the
“hedging” variant of the exponential weights algorithm [5] in genericN -player games
that admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Motivated by the applications of
game theory to data networks, we focused on two different models regarding the
information available to the players: i) perfect mixed payoff observations (where
players know the payoff vector associated to their mixed strategies); and ii) im-
perfect, pure payoff observations (where players only know the payoff associated to
each of their pure strategies, possibly up to some random estimation error). Using
the theory of stochastic approximation and discrete-time martingale processes, we
show that the algorithm converges locally to a strict Nash equilibrium and this
convergence is exponentially fast – even in the presence of uncertainty and noise of
arbitrary magnitude.
An important extension of this work would be to consider the so-called “bandit
feedback” setting where players are only able to observe the payoff of the action
that they actually played and can only estimate the payoff of their other actions
via the game’s history. Another important issue is that of asynchronicity, namely
when players update at different times and there is a delay between playing and
receiving feedback. We intend to explore these directions in future work.
Appendix A. Auxiliary results
We begin with the variational characterization (5) of strict Nash equilibria:
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume first that x∗ is a strict equilibrium. Then, for all
i ∈ N , we have
〈vi(x)|xi − x∗i 〉 = ui(xi;x−i)− ui(x∗i ;x−i)
=
∑
si 6=s∗i
xisiui(si;x−i) + xis∗i ui(s
∗
i ;x−i)− ui(s∗i ;x−i)
=
∑
si 6=s∗i
xisi [ui(si;x−i)− ui(s∗i ;x−i)] , (A.1)
where the first line is a consequence of (3) while the last one follows by noting that∑
si 6=s∗i
xisi = 1− xis∗i and rearranging.
Now, by continuity – and the fact that x∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
N ) is a strict equilibrium
– there exists a real number a > 0 and a neighborhood U of x∗ in X such that for
all si ∈ Si \ {s∗i }, ui(s∗i ;x−i)− ui(si;x−i) ≥ a > 0. Therefore:
〈vi(x)|xi − x∗i 〉 ≤ −a
∑
si 6=s∗i
xisi (A.2)
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Hence, combining Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2), we get the bound
〈v(x)|x − x∗〉 =
∑
i∈N
〈vi(x)|xi − x∗i 〉 ≤ −a
∑
i∈N
∑
si 6=s∗i
xisi ≤ −
a
2
‖xi − x∗i ‖, (A.3)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that x∗isi = 0 if si 6= s∗i so ‖xi−x∗i ‖ =
1− xis∗i +
∑
si 6=s∗i
xisi = 2
∑
si 6=s∗i
xisi .
Assume now that x∗ satisfies (5) but is not a strict Nash equilibrium, so visi(x
∗) ≤
vis′i(x
∗) for some si ∈ supp(x∗i ), s′i ∈ Si \ {si}, i ∈ N . Then, if we take xi =
x∗i + λ(eis′i − eisi) and x−i = x∗−i with λ > 0 small enough, we get
〈v(x)|x − x∗〉 = 〈vi(x)|xi − x∗i 〉 = λvis′i (x∗)− λvisi (x∗) ≥ 0, (A.4)
in contradiction to (5) which yields 〈v(x)|x − x∗〉 < 0 This shows that x∗ is strict
and completes our proof. 
We now prove two important properties of the logit map and the KL divergence:
Proposition A.8. Let S = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set and let ∆ ≡ ∆(S) denote the
(n− 1)-dimensional simplex spanned by S. Then:
(1) If x∗ ∈ ∆ is pure (i.e. supp(x∗) = {s∗} for some s∗ ∈ S), the set UM =
{x = Λ(y) : ys − ys∗ ≤ −M for all s 6= s∗} is a neighborhood of x∗ in
∆◦; furthermore, if M is sufficiently large, UM is contained in a ‖·‖-ball
centered at x∗.
(2) Let x = Λ(y), x′ = Λ(y′) for some y, y′ ∈ Rn. Then, we have
DKL(x
∗, x′) ≤ DKL(x∗, x) + 〈y′ − y|x− x∗〉+ 1
2
‖y′ − y‖2∞. (A.5)
Proof. For our first claim, we assume to the contrary that UM is not a neighborhood
of x∗ in X ◦. So there exists a sequence xk = Λ(yk) in X ◦ that converges to x∗,
but xk /∈ UM for all k. By passing to a subsequence if necessary, there exists some
s ∈ S such that yk,s−yk,s∗ > −M and yk,s ≥ yk,s′ for all s′ (simply pick a constant
subsequence of argmax{yk,s′ : yk,s′ − yk,s∗ > −M} if needed). We then get
xk,s =
eyk,s∑
s′ e
yk,s′
=
1
eyk,s∗−yk,s +
∑
s′ 6=s∗ e
yk,s′−yk,s
≥ 1
eM + n− 1 , (A.6)
contradicting the original assumption xk,s → 0 (since xk → x∗).
For the converse implication (namely that UM is contained in a ball centered at
x∗), fix some δ > 0 and let zs = ys − ys∗ , s ∈ S \ {s∗}. Then, letting x = Λ(y) for
some y ∈ UM , we have
xs∗ =
eys∗∑
s∈S e
ys
=
1
1 +
∑
s6=s∗ e
zs
≥ 1−
∑
s6=s∗
ezs ≥ 1− (n− 1)e−M . (A.7)
Thus, for M > |log δ|2(n−1) , we obtain
‖x− x∗‖ = 2(1− xs∗) ≤ 2(n− 1)e−M ≤ δ, (A.8)
implying that UM is contained in the ball Bδ = {x : ‖x− x∗‖ ≤ δ}.
Finally, for our second claim, let h(x) =
∑
s xs log xs, x ∈ ∆, and let h∗(y) =
max{〈y|x〉 − h(x)} = log (∑s eys) denote the convex conjugate of h [16, 19]. Then,
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a straightforward derivation yields
∂h∗
∂ys
=
exp(ys)∑
s′ exp(ys′)
= Λs(y), (A.9)
so, by the properties of the Legendre transform [16], we get Λ(y) = argmax{〈y|x〉−
h(x)}. Therefore, taking x = Λ(y), the KL divergence becomes
DKL(x
∗, x) = h(x∗)− h(x) − 〈∇h(x)|x − x∗〉
= h(x∗) + 〈y|x〉 − h(x) − 〈y|x〉 − 〈∇h(x)|x − x∗〉
= h(x∗) + h∗(y)− 〈y|x∗〉
=: F (x∗, y), (A.10)
where F (x∗, y) is the so-called Fenchel coupling [14], and we used the fact that
y = ∇h(x) (recall that x = Λ(y) is defined as the maximizer of the quantity
〈y|x〉 − h(x)).
With this in mind, it suffices to show that
F (x∗, y′) ≤ F (x∗, y) + 〈y′ − y|Λ(y)− x∗〉+ 1
2
‖y′ − y‖2∞. (A.11)
However, since h is 1-strongly convex with respect to the L1 norm [19, p. 135], it
follows that its convex conjugate h∗ is 1-strongly smooth with respect to the L∞
norm (the dual of the L1-norm) [19, p. 148]. Specifically, this implies that
h∗(y′) ≥ h∗(y) + 〈y′ − y|∇h∗(y)〉+ 1
2
‖y′ − y‖2∞ (A.12)
Eq. (A.11) then follows by writing out the definition of F (x∗, y′) and then using
(A.12) and (A.9).  
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